The exponential growth in the numbers of empiricists helps resolve another debate as old as that of the Greeks. Platonists are sympathetic to rule by experts and elites. Aristotelians are more receptive to democratic rule. Expertise in the form of empiricism straddles these two political poles. It is a more democratic expertise in that it is replicable, transparent, and sharable. Moreover, it is disciplined by the information inputs of blogs and information markets. Thus, expert judgments will no longer be those of the few wise persons who rely on authority to impress their conclusions on society. Instead, they will reflect the collective sentiments of the empirical community.
This kind of work demonstrates how empiricism can have influence without generating its own values. The values being assumed here are those implicit in the operations of the academic community itself.
Two other factors — themselves a product of our ongoing technological revolutions — will amplify the power of empiricism. One is the rise of blogs. Blogs help police and expose false studies with which interest groups and partisans may attempt to counter the empirical work that undermines the factual bases of their positions. Academic experts regularly write for blogs and, unlike reporters, are well suited to subject empirical work to searching scrutiny. Recently, for instance, a group of prominent legal scholars has begun a blog wholly devoted to law and empiricism. Such developments will also force empiricists to be more careful and transparent about the discretionary decisions they make, such as their choices of time periods to include in their investigations, because their colleagues will be able to call them to account for misjudgement or bias more easily.
The declining cost of empiricism also promises to transform our universities, because it provides greater incentives to hire empirical investigators in the social sciences. A hundred years ago, armchair speculation was very cheap compared to empiricism, as the cost of the latter enterprise was high, often prohibitively so, in that the available technology rarely delivered any useful results. Thus, it was rational for universities to hire theorists without much interest in comprehensive and statistical inquiry into the social world. But now that the cost of empiricism has fallen, a cascade of empiricists of all kinds — economists, psychologists, political scientists — is flowing into our universities and think tanks.
This inflow has several immediate effects, all of them beneficial to a free inquiry that will in turn aid the gathering of facts conducive to consensus politics. First, the hiring of empiricists will tend to decrease any ideological discrimination in academia, because empiricists, whatever their personal politics, will tend to be much more open-minded than their theoretically inclined colleagues. They respect facts themselves and professionally must give a hearing to other empiricists, whatever their views and whatever the results of their empirical investigations. They will also be less prone to discriminate, even in hiring theorists in their social science departments, because empiricists are likely to regard almost all theories as contestable.
Far more important to the future of America is the battle over substantive issues. Empiricism has already created a consensus in some areas, crime being one of the foremost among them. In the 1960s and 70s, the political community was much divided about the basic approach to crime. Some experts then attacked prison sentences as destructive rather than useful and even contended that certain criminal acts, like writing graffiti, should not be considered crimes at all.
But criminologists have turned to empiricism to show the truth of claims previously contested. It turns out that that prison sentences sharply reduce crime, as does the greater presence of police on the streets. Steve Levitt recognized that prison-overcrowding litigation created a natural experiment for testing the extent to which prison sentences reduced crime because the litigation released prisoners for reasons that had nothing to do with crime rates. By looking at the consequences of the prison litigation, he was able to show that for each criminal released from the prison population, the number of crimes will increase by about 15.